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Abstract 
Objective - This study aims to identify the effect of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) function 
on the level of earnings quality in Indonesian Islamic banks. SSB criteria used in this study are 
size, frequency of Meeting and educational background (Finance / Accounting). 
Method - Panel data regression is employed to analyze the effect of Shariah Supervisory Board 
characteristics on the earning quality of Islamic bank. The data were taken from 11 full-fledge 
Islamic banks in Indonesia with available financial statements from period 2010 to 2015.   
Results - The size of Shariah Supervisory Board members has a positive effect on the 
improvement of earning quality in Islamic banking. Two other variables, namely the frequency 
of SSB meetings and educational background do not affect the improvement of earnings quality. 
Conclusion - Studies of the role of Shariah Supervisory Board to the quality of financial 
statements is still limited, especially in the quality of earning that became the basis in 
determining the distribution of Islamic banks profit sharing. The main contribution in this 
research is that the role of SSB should be improved in order to increase the quality of financial 
reporting. 
Keyword: Earning quality, Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB), Islamic/Islamic Bank. 
 
Abstrak 
Tujuan - Penelitian ini bertujuan mengidentifikasi fungsi DPS terhadap tingkat kualitas laba di 
perbankan syariah Indonesia. Kriteria DPS yang digunakan dalam penelitian Jumlah DPS, 
Frekuensi Rapat DPS dan Riwayat pendidikan (Keuangan/Akuntansi) DPS.  
Metode - Regresi data panel dilakukan untuk menganalisis pengaruh karakteristik DPS tersebut 
terhadap kualitas laba bank syariah. Data diambil dari 11 Bank Umum Syariah di Indonesia 
dengan periode laporan keuangan 2010 hingga 2015.  
Hasil - Jumlah anggota DPS berpengaruh positif terhadap peningkatan kualitas laba di 
perbankan syariah.  dua variabel lainnya, yaitu Frekuensi rapat DPS dan Riwayat pendidikan 
tidak berpengaruh terhadap peningkatan kualitas laba.  
Kesimpulan - Studi tentang peran DPS terhadap kualitas laporan keuangan masih terbatas, 
khususnya pada kualitas laba yang menjadi basis dalam penentuan distribusi bagi hasil bank 
syariah. Kontribusi utama pada penelitian ini adalah bahwa peran DPS harus ditingkatkan dalam 
rangka peningkatan kualitas laporan keuangan. 
Kata Kunci: Kualitas laba, DPS, Bank Syariah 
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1. Introduction 
Islamic banks have become a solution for Muslims in conducting financial transactions to 
support economic activities. In 1992, the first Islamic banks operated in Indonesia. Those 
opportunities are followed by conventional banks that operated windows channeling or Islamic 
Business Unit to spin off from the parent company. This is due to the enormous potential of 
Islamic banking services in Indonesia. 
In general, Islamic banks operate almost the same as conventional banks, which collect funds 
from the surplus and alocating funds to the deficit party. However, Islamic banks have more 
products than in conventional banks. Islamic financial services must be in accordance with the 
values and rules of Islamic law, among which must avoid maysir (gambling), gharar 
(uncertainty) and riba (interest) elements. In Islamic banks, every customer needs have certain 
characteristics, so they required contracts with a certain scheme. For consumptive financing, 
Islamic banks use Murabahah, Salam or Istisna' contract, while for working capital financing 
they use Mudharabah or Musharakah contract. In addition, if customers want to apply for lease 
financing, then Islamic banks can use Ijarah contract. And there are many other contracts to 
meet the needs of customers, such as Hiwalah, Kafalah, and so on. 
To meet the needs of dhuafa community, Islamic banks can distribute zakat, infaq and 
shodaqoh. If zakat, infaq, and shodaqoh's fund is limited then it will be distributed to dhuafa 
community with a priority scale. However, Islamic banks are also allowed to use qardhul hasan 
contracts where the customers only have to refund the principal cost without being charged from 
profit sharing or margin.  
Public awareness of non riba transaction increased with the spread of Islamic propagation. As 
Allah SWT expresses firmly in the Qur'an about the obligation to abandon the transaction of 
Riba (Surah Al-Baqarah: 275). Now there are 12 full fledge Islamic banks operated in 
Indonesia. The development of Islamic banks can be seen in the following figure. 
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Figure 1: Statistics of Islamic banking development in Indonesia (2017) 
The total Asset of Full fledge Islamic banks equal to Rp. 248.8 trillion which is found from 13 
Islamic banks, while total asset of 21 Sharia business unit equal to Rp. Rp. 95.4 trillions and 166 
Sharia rural banks. However, along with the development of Islamic banks, there are some 
Indonesian people who doubt the implementation of Islamic law in Islamic banking operations 
(Mukhlisin, 2017). This should be basis of evaluation and introspection of each Islamic bank. 
The improvement of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) is expected to provide solutions to the 
doubts and disappointments of the community towards Islamic bank.  
The uniqueness of GCG structure in Islamic bank is the existence of Shariah Supervisory Board 
(SSB) (Grassa & Mautoussi, 2012). The role of SSB in Islamic banking is very important. They 
have a responsibility to ensure that business activities in Islamic banks are in line with Islamic 
rules, halal products and also providing benefit of all stakeholders in order to avoid things that 
violate the values of Islam. SSB plays a role in ensuring that all Islamic bank must comply with 
Islamic law. This body will assist the Board of Directors in controlling managers to conduct 
business activities in Islamic banks. The Shariah Supervisory Board is part of the Islamic 
banking governance component that plays a role in providing oversight of the policies and 
2017
Jan
 -   Total Aset         204,961         213,423         248,819 - Total Assets
 -   Jumlah Bank                  12                  12                  13 - Number of Banks
 -   Jumlah Kantor              2,163             1,990             1,681 - Number of Offices
- KC 447               450               474               Branch Officess
- KCP 1,511            1,340            1,207            Sub Branch Offices
- KK 205               200               192               Cash Offices
- ATM 3,350            3,571            3,142            ATMs/ADMs
- Jumlah Tenaga Kerja 41,393          51,413          51,168          - Number of Employees
 -   Total Aset           67,383           82,839           95,470 - Total Assets
 -   Jumlah Bank Umum  Konvensional yang 
memiliki UUS  
                 22                  22                  21 - Number of Conventional Banks 
that have Sharia Business Unit
 -   Jumlah Kantor UUS                320                311                285 - Number of Offices
- KC 138               138               150               Branch Officess
- KCP 140               129               135               Sub Branch Offices
- KK 42                 44                 48                 Cash Offices
- ATM 132               145               133               ATMs/ADMs
- Jumlah Tenaga Kerja 4,425            4,403            4,555            - Number of Employees
Total Aset BUS dan UUS 272,343        296,262        344,290        Total Assets 
Total Kantor BUS dan UUS 2,483            2,301            1,966            
Total ATM BUS dan UUS 3,482            3,716            3,275            
Total Tenaga Kerja BUS dan UUS 45,818          55,816          55,597          
 -   Jumlah Bank                 163                163                166 - Number of Banks
 -   Jumlah Kantor                 439                446                451 - Number of Offices
 -  Jumlah Tenaga Kerja             4,704             5,102             4,478 - Number of Employees
Indicator
Tabel 2. Perkembangan Total Aset, Jaringan Kantor dan Tenaga Kerja Perbankan Syariah - 
SPS 2016
(Sharia Banking Network)
 Indikator 2014 2015
 Bank Umum Syariah  Sharia Commercial Bank
 Unit Usaha Syariah  Sharia Business Unit
 Bank Pembiayaan Rakyat Syariah  Sharia Rural Bank
Total Number of Offices
Total Number of ATMs/ADMs
Total Number of Employees
Note:  r) Revised figuresKet:  r) Angka-angka diperbaiki
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decisions of the Board of Directors or Managers in the implementation of banking service 
(Khandelwal, 2009). 
The improvement of the company's financial statements quality is also one of the contributions 
that are not less important in carrying out the function of SSB (Rini, 2014). They must ensure 
that every policy of the board of directors and managers is in accordance with the goals of 
Islamic (Maqosid Asy Islamich). Including in determination of the financial policies that have 
impacts on stakeholders are: Employee wages, the distribution of zakat funds, Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), etc. the main goal of Islamic banks activities is realization of benefit to 
the people (Abdul rahman, 2012) 
One of the financial policies undertaken by Islamic bank management is allocation of allowance 
for losses on financing provided to customers or called by Loan Loss Provision (LLP) (Taktak 
et al., 2010). This allocation is conducted to avoid the fluctuation of profit volatility in Islamic 
banking. There is an indication of moral hazard in the LLP determination. This is proposed to 
maintain the benefit of every stakeholder. Therefore, Shariah Supervisory Board is required to 
play an important role in ensuring that the policy in determining the LLP ratio is not harmful 
and provides justice amongst stakeholders in Islamic banks.  
Overallocation in the determination of  LLP will have an impact for each stakeholder. 
Therefore, the role of SSB and other structures is crucial in determining the LLP ratio policy for 
financial statements in every period. So that no element of tyranny will affect some 
stakeholders. If the LLP ratio is closer to normal, it will further improve the quality of earnings.  
There have been several previous studies conducted with mix results. Hamdi & Zarai (2014) 
conducted study on 90 Islamic banks, they found that Shariah Supervisory Board has no effect 
on the minimization of earnings management. This is due to the fact that SSB is not involved in 
making financial related policies. However, Rini (2014) conducted a study on 33 Islamic banks 
in Indonesia found that the role of Shariah Supervisory Board have a significant effect on the 
quality of financial statements. The higher of SSB size in Islamic banks is expected to improve 
the quality of earnings. This is because the role of SSB is very significant in every policy line 
proposed by the board of directors and managers of Islamic banks. Especially, in terms of 
determination of profit, it will be more accurate if taken consideration from many sources. The 
large size of SSB will provide an opinion comparison in the event of any disagreements or 
debates among SSB members. So the result is not subjective from one person's opinion. 
The frequency of Shariah Supervisory Board meetings is also considered to have an effect on 
the quality of earnings. Meeting of SSB members is a coordination and discussion linked to 
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matters related to Islamic bank operations. The more frequent the member meetings being held, 
the faster to provide solutions of the problems faced by Islamic banks (Shittu et al., 2016). In 
overseeing the financial performance of Islamic banking, intensive meetings will result quality 
decisions or policies. The higher intensity of the SSB meeting, it is expected to boost the 
performance of Islamic banking. This includes also in determining the profitability of Islamic 
banks that have been prepared by managers. If the specified profit is resulted from the 
discretionary loan loss provision, then it will affect the revenue share which will be distributed. 
As in the study Shittu et al. (2016), it uses the intensity or frequency of meetings as a factor 
affecting earning per share. 
In addition, financial or accounting background of Shariah Supervisory Board is also expected 
to affect the quality of earnings. SSB qualification is expected to improve the quality of 
earnings. SSB is also required to understand in the field of accounting and finance, because 
Islamic banks can’t operate without the both fields of knowledge. By having the insight and 
knowledge of accounting and finance, SSB's decision will be more qualified, especially related 
to the financial statements. Faradila & Cahyati (2013) concluded that the competence of SSB 
can reduce earnings management in the financial statements of Islamic banks. Appropriate 
qualifications and expertise in the field of Islamic and finance are required to monitor the 
implementation of operations in Islamic banks (Ghayad, 2008; Alnasser & Muhammad, 2012). 
For example, determining non-halal income depends on the level of SSB expertise in Islamic 
and financial accounting (Rashidah & Faisal, 2012); Wardhany & Arshad, 2012). In analyzing 
whether a transaction is halal or haram using Islamic sciences and accounting / financial 
expertise is to provide solutions to such transactions in the accounting system. 
Based on the study from Abdullah, Percy and Stewart (2013) who examined the relationship 
between disclosure rates and the role of the Shariah Supervisory Board, they found that only 
five of the 23 SSB conducted Islamic compliance verification in allocating profit/loss share and 
in terms of the validity of the zakat calculation. This result may be influenced by a lack of 
accounting and finance expertise in SSB qualifications. 
This study aims to identify the function of SSB to the level of earnings quality in Indonesian 
Islamic banking. The main product of Islamic banking is profit loss sharing. Therefore, profit 
becomes the most important source of data in the implementation of the profit sharing 
distribution. Then, the management of Islamic banks must provide accurate and reliable 
financial statements. Especially in terms of profit determination, Islamic Banks are granted 
discretionary loan loss provision which will affect the amount of profit (Othman & Mersni, 
2014). If the profits determination is inaccurate, it will harm other stakeholders, especially for 
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customers who deposit their money for less than one year. Therefore, it is necessary to measure 
the quality of earning. 
The quality of earning in Islamic banks can be measured by Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions 
(Taktak et al, 2010). The lower value of the discretionary LLP the higher level of the quality of 
earning. The SSB criteria used in this study are Size of SSB, Frequency of SSB Meeting and 
Educational Background of SSB (Finance/Accounting).  
2. Research Methods 
This research is a quantitative research by conducting panel data regression between 
independent variable and dependent variable. The data panel is defined as a combination of the 
series data and cross section data.  
The data employed in this study is secondary data taken from the financial statements of 12 full-
fledge Islamic Banks in Indonesia which are published through the website of each Islamic bank 
in Indonesia. Period of financial statements employed in this study is the financial statements of 
each Islamic bank from period 2010 to 2015. So the estimation of observation data in this study 
are 68 yearly financial reports. The samples in this study must meet the following criteria: 
a. Full-fledge Islamic banks in Indonesia 
b. Islamic banks with six period’s Annual report. 
2.1.  Data Analysis Method 
Data are taken from the financial statements which are downloaded through the websites of each 
Islamic Bank. The financial statements used are the last 6 years from each Islamic Bank. Data 
are analyzed using Eviews software to run data panels. This data panel regression uses the 
unbalanced data panel method due to the limitations of data, some of which do not have a 
predetermined period. This is due to different in the operation of those Islamic banks. 
2.2.  Analysis Model 
DLLPit = β0 + β1 SIZEit + β2 MEETit + β3 EDUit + εit....................Formula 1 
DLLP  : The level of earning quality as measured by the DiscretionaryLLP 
SIZE : Number of SSB members 
MEET : Frequency of SSB meetings 
EDU : 1 if at least one member of SSB has a financial or accounting educational background. 
0 is otherwise. 
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2.3.  Variable Measurement 
The dependent variable is the earning quality. Based on the research conducted by Othman and 
Mershni (2014) Loan Loss Provision is a combination of nondiscretionary and discretionary 
LLP, so to get the result of discretionary LLP is to subtract LLP with nondiscretionary LLP. 
LLP = Nondiscretionary LLP + Discretionary LLP 
Discretionary LLP (DLLP) = LLP - Nondiscretionary LLP 
Discretionary LLP is obtained from the residual estimate of the following regression: 
LLPit = β0 + β1 NPFit-1 + β2 ΔNPFit + β3 ΔTFit + εit........Formula 2 
LLP   : Loan Loss Provision 
NPF : Non Performing Financing 
ΔNPF : Changes of Non Performing Financing  
ΔTF : Changes of Total Financing  
With the absolute value approach, the earning quality variable is measured by omitting the 
minus sign (-). This is because if the value is further away from the number 0, then the lower the 
earning quality. The smaller the residual value estimation, the higher the level of earning quality 
of Islamic banks. The independent variable as described in the following table: 
Table 1. Definition of Independent Variables 
No Independent Variables Definition 
1 Size of SSB Number of SSB in each Islamic bank 
2 SSB Meetings Frequency of meetings conducted or attended by 
SSB for a year 
3 Educational Background Education or certification on Financial or 
Accounting training ever taken by at least one of 
the SSBs. 
 
2.4.  Panel Data Estimation Method B 
There are three models of panel data estimation: 
a) Common Effect Model 
The Common Effect or Pooled Least Square Model is an estimation model that combines 
time series data and cross section data using the OLS (Ordinary Least Square) approach to 
estimate its parameters. 
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b) Fixed Effect Model 
Fixed Effect Model is a technique of estimating panel data by using dummy variable to 
capture the difference of intercept. The definition of Fixed Effect is based on the difference 
between the intercept of the company, but the intercept is the same between times period 
(time in variant). In addition, this model also assumes that the regression coefficient (slope) 
remains between firms and between times period. 
c) Random Effect Model  
Random Effect Model is a model of panel regression estimation with assumption of 
coefficient of slope and intercept is different between individual and inter-time (Random 
Effect). The inclusion of dummy variables in the Random Effect Model aims to represent 
ignorance about the actual model. 
2.5.  Development of Research Hypothesis 
2.5.1. The Effect of Number of SSB Members on the Earning Quality 
The more number of SSB members in Islamic banks is expected to improve the quality of 
earnings. This is because the role of SSB is very significant in every policy line proposed by the 
board of directors and managers of Islamic banks. So the resulting decisions, especially in terms 
of determination of profit, will be more accurate and accurate if taken consideration from many 
sources. As the study by Hamdi & Zarai (2014) found that the number of SSB has no effect on 
earnings management mitigation. However, Rini (2014) found that the role of SSB affects the 
quality of financial statements. Hence the first hypothesis in this study is as follows: 
H1: The number of SSB members influences the Quality of earnings level 
2.5.2. Effect of Frequency of SSB Meeting on the Earnings Quality 
The higher intensity of the SSB meetings is expected to boost the performance of Islamic 
banking. This includes also in determining the profitability of Islamic banks that have been 
prepared by managers. If the profit determined as a result of the discretion of the allowance for 
excessive losses, it will affect the revenue share to be distributed. As in the study Shittu et al. 
(2016) uses the intensity or frequency of meetings as a factor affecting earning per share. Then 
the second hypothesis in this study is as follows: 
H2: Frequency of meetings of SSB affects the earnings quality level 
2.5.3. Effect of Financial Education or Accounting to the Earnings Quality 
SSB qualification is expected to enhance the quality of earnings. SSB is also required to 
understand the both field of accounting and finance. Because Islamic banks operation cannot be 
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separated from the both fields. By having the insight and knowledge of both accounting and 
finance, SSB's decision will be more qualified, especially related to the financial statements. As 
the study by Hamdi & Zarai (2014) found that the competence of SSB has no effect on earnings 
management mitigation. Furthermore, Faradila & Cahyati (2013) concluded that the competence 
of SSB can reduce earnings management in the financial statements of Islamic banks. Then the 
third hypothesis in this study is as follows: 
H3: Financial or accounting education affects the quality of earnings. 
3. Discussion and Results 
3.1.  Data Description 
From the 12 Islamic Banks, one of Islamic Bank is excluded in this study because it has only 
two financial reporting periods, namely the Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Negara Syariah. The 
Islamic bank has just undertaken spin off in 2013. In addition, there are two Islamic banks that 
do not have financial statements in 2015. Therefore, the collection target of 60 observations data 
is not succeeded, so the observation data employed in this study only 53 observations data. 
3.1.1. Description of Data Statistics 1 
Table 2. Description of Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LLP  53 10.94 1.58 8.37 13.81 
NPF 53 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.07 
ΔNPF 53 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.30 
ΔTF 53 6.37 1.86 2.24 9.45 
 
Loan Loss Provision (LLP) has an average of 10.94 and a minimum of 8.37 and a maximum of 
13.81, indicating that Islamic banks in Indonesia are still relatively high in allocating allowance 
for losses. Non Performing Financing (NPF) has an average of 0.03 and a minimum of 0.00 and 
a maximum of 0.07, indicating that the NPF of Islamic banks in Indonesia are still relatively 
small below 10%. While changes in NPF (ΔNPF) have an average of 0.01 and a minimum of -
0.03 and a maximum of 0.30, this indicates that Islamic banks in Indonesia are not very 
fluctuated in NPF. In addition, the change in the number of financing at the Indonesian Islamic 
Bank is still quite high with an average of 6.37 and a minimum of 2.24 and a maximum of 9.45. 
This shows that the growth of Islamic bank financing from year to year is still quite high. 
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3.1.3 Description of Data Statistic 2 
Table 3. Description of Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DLLP 53 0.15 1.52 -3.68 3.89 
SIZE 53 2.38 0.49 2 3 
MEET 53 14.28 4.11 7 30 
 
The Discretionary Loan Loss Provision (DLLP) has an average of 0.15 and a minimum of -3.68 
and a maximum of 3.89, indicating that Islamic banks in Indonesia are still doing earning 
management but it si still lower. The size of SSB (SIZE) has an average of 2.38 and a minimum 
of 2 persons and a maximum of 3 persons, indicating that each Islamic bank in Indonesia has 
SSB of more than one person and the majorities have two persons SSB members. While the 
frequency of SSB meetings (MEET) has an average of 14.28 times and a minimum of 7 times 
and a maximum of 30 times, it shows that SSB of Islamic banks in Indonesia have high 
frequency of meetings. In addition, five out of 11 (45%) of Islamic Banks have SSB with an 
accounting and financial education background (EDU). This indicates that almost of SSB 
members have no accounting and financial education background. 
3.2 Test of Classic Assumption Data Panel 1 
3.2.1 Normality Test 
The normality test is intended to test whether the residual values that have been standardized in 
the regression model are normally distributed or not. 
Figure 2. Normality Test (Formula 2) 
By using the Jarque Bera test, it has a significance above 0.05, which means that the residual is 
normally distributed. 
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-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2011 2015
Observations 55
Mean      -3.37e-15
Median   0.105799
Maximum  3.894362
Minimum -3.894761
Std. Dev.   1.675519
Skewness  -0.138001
Kurtosis   3.240338
Jarque-Bera  0.306944
Probability  0.857725
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3.2.2 Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity test aims to test whether in the regression model that formed there is a high or 
perfect correlation between independent variables. If all correlation values between independent 
variables are below or equal to 0.8, then it can be concluded that it is free of multicollinearity. 
Table 4. Multicollinearity Test 
Variable  NPF  _NPF  _TF 
NPF   1.000000   0.110723   0.109788 
_NPF   0.110723   1.000000  -0.191723 
_TF   0.109788  -0.191723   1.000000 
 
3.3  Test of Classic Assumption Data Panel 2 
3.3.1. Normality test 
Figure 3: Normality Test (Formula 1) 
The normality test is intended to test whether the residual values that have been standardized in 
the regression model are normally distributed or not. By using the Jarque Bera test, it has a 
significance above 0.05, which means that the residual is normally distributed. 
3.3.2. Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity test aims to test whether in the regression model that formed there is a high or 
perfect correlation between independent variables. 
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2011 2015
Observations 53
Mean       1.84e-16
Median   0.131090
Maximum  2.552010
Minimum -3.795339
Std. Dev.   1.329634
Skewness  -0.229216
Kurtosis   3.008594
Jarque-Bera  0.464264
Probability  0.792841
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Table 5. Multicollinearity Test 
 
 
 
 
 
If all correlation values between independent variables are below or equal to 0.8, then it can be 
concluded that it is free of multicollinearity 
3.3.3. Heteroscedasticity Test 
Figure 4 : Heteroscedasticity Test 
Heteroscedasticity test aims to test whether in the regression model that formed the variation 
inequality of the residual regression model.  
3.3.4. Autocorrelation Test 
Autocorrelation test aims to determine whether there is a correlation between members of a 
series of observational data sorted by time or space. Autocorrelation can be detected through the 
Durbin-Waston (DW) method. 
Table 6. Autocorrelation Test 
DW 0.936753 
Dl 1.4523  
DU 1.6815 
DW< Dl 0.936753 <1.4523 
There is a positive autocorrelation 
 
Variable  SIZE MEET  EDU 
      
      SIZE   1.000000 -0.408274   0.563086 
MEET  -0.408274  1.000000  -0.198638 
EDU   0.563086 -0.198638   1.000000 
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3.4.  Panel Data Estimation Method for Formula 1 
Discretionary LLP is obtained from estimated residuals from the following regression: 
LLPit = β0 + β1 NPFit-1 + β2 ΔNPFit + β3 ΔTFit + εit 
LLP   : Loan Loss Provision 
NPF : Non Performing Financing 
ΔNPF : Non Performing Financing Changes 
ΔTF : Total Financing Changes 
Data were analyzed using Eviews software to regressing data panels. Determination of 
discretionary LLP value is obtained from estimated residual from Random Effect. 
3.5. Selection of Panel Regression Model 1 
In order to get the best model, two tests were performed: Chow test and Hausman test. 
a) Chow Test 
Chow test is a test to determine the Fixed Effect or Common Effect model that is more 
appropriate to be use in estimating panel data. By looking at the probability value (Prob.) For 
Cross-section F. If the value is >0.05 (specified at the beginning as the level of significance or 
alpha) then the selected model is CE, but if <0.05 then the selected model is FE. In the above 
table, it shows that the value of Prob. Cross-section F of 0.0001 whose value is <0.0 5. So it can 
be concluded that the FE model is more appropriate than the CE model. 
b) Hausman Test 
Conducted to compare/choose which model is the best between FE and RE, by looking at 
probability value (Prob.) Cross-section random. If the value is >0.05 then the selected model is 
RE, but if <0.05 then the selected model is FE. In the table above, it shows that the value of 
Prob. Cross-section random of 0.8319 whose value is >0.05. So it can be concluded that the RE 
model is more appropriate than the FE model. From two model selection tests it can be 
concluded that Random Effect model is better than FE and CE model. 
3.6.  Selection of Panel Regression Model B 
a) Chow Test and Hausman Test 
Not used because fixed effect model can’t run data. 
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b) LM Test 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) is a test to determine whether the random effect model or common 
effect model that is more appropriate to be used. The LM test is based on the distribution of chi-
squares with degree of freedom by the number of independent variables.  
a. If the result from LM count > Chi-Square table, then use random effect 
b. If the result from LM count<Chi-Square table, then use common model. 
The value of Chi Squared table on degrees of freedom 2 and alpha 5% is 7,815 (see Chi Squared 
table) and the LM count is 6.336, so if the LM value is bigger compared to Chi Squared table, 
then the model chosen is common model. 
c) Significance Test 
1. Correlation Analysis 
Partial correlation analysis is used to determine the relationship between two variables in which 
other variables considered influential are controlled or made fixed (as control variables). 
Table 7. Panel Data Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
       
       C -1.040548 1.555778  -0.668828  0.5067 
SIZE -0.898083 0.504708  1.779412  0.0314* 
MEET -0.076161 0.050718  -1.501642  0.1396 
EDU 0.353993 0.465879  0.759841  0.4510 
 
From the above common effect model obtained coefficient of determination R
2
 (R-square) 
between SIZE, MEET, and EDU with DLLP is 0.234628. Then the value of R is √0.234628 = 
0.484384145. The result shows that there is a moderate relationship between the three 
independent variables with the dependent variable. 
2. The Panel Data Regression Equation 2 
This model of analysis is a quantitative analysis used to determine the extent of the influence 
between independent variables with dependent variables. 
DLLPit = β0 + β1 SIZEit + β2 MEETit + β3 EDUit + εit 
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DLLP =-1.04054790681-0.898082908792*SIZE-
0.0761609475941*MEET+0.353993426317*EDU 
3. Partial Regression Coefficient Test (t test) 
The t test is used to look at the significance of individual independent effects on the dependent 
variable by assuming other variables are constant. The result shows that SIZE has a significat 
negative effect on earning quality with the coefficient -0. 898083 and level of significant is 5 % 
(0.0314). it means that the higher size of SSB the lower the discretionary loan loss provision or 
the higher the earning quality of Islamic bank. However, both MEET and EDU have no 
significant effect on earning quality which is shown by significant value above 5%, 0.1396 for 
MEET and 0.4510 for EDU. 
4. Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
Determination coefficient analysis is used to know the percentage of SIZE, MEET and EDU 
against DLLP. And based on the output table of the common effect model above, it can be seen 
that the R-square value of 0.234628 means that together the SIZE, MEET and EDU variables 
have contributed to explain the DLLP of 23%. 
d) Hypothesis Test 
1. The Size of SSB Members Influence against the Level of Earning quality 
The result shows that there is a positive correlation between the size of Shariah Supervisory 
Board and the quality of earning in Islamic bank. The large size of SSB members improve the 
quality of earning in Islamic banks. This explains that with the presence of more than one 
member of SSB, potentially reduce the discretionary allowance for the elimination of 
productive assets in Islamic banking. Decisions taken from more than one opinion will be more 
objective than the one-person decision. So the policies issued are completely balanced and not 
only in favor of one's interests. Because the risk level of Islamic banks is quite high, then 
allocating discretionary LLP is considered safe in the face of Indonesia's uncertain economic 
condition. So that management decision making which also includes SSB recommendations, 
the result generated in a more careful decision. As the study conducted by Rini (2014), she 
found that the size of SSB members affected the quality of financial statements. And the results 
of this study are not in line with the research of Ghayad (2008), Anwar, et al. (2011) and 
Suryanto (2014), who conducted research on the role of SSB on the degradation in earning 
management of Islamic banks. 
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2. The Effect of SSB Meeting Frequency on Earning quality Level 
Meeting frequency of SSB has no effect on earnings quality. This is because the allocation of 
LLP is a policy issued by the management of Islamic bank. The frequency of meetings in a 
year does not affect management policy, so it does not affect the earning quality of Islamic 
banks. SSB tends to be less involved in strategic decision-makers, and the tendency of 
information assimmetry between top management and SSB. This is in line with the research of 
Shittu et al. (2016) which uses the intensity of SSB meetings as a factor that does not affect 
earnings per share. 
3. The Effect of Financial or Accounting Education on Earning quality Level 
The educational background of financial or accounting has no effect on the level of earnings 
quality. This is due to the lack of expertise of some SSB in the field of accounting and finance, 
so they do not to affect the overall earning quality. The earnings management policy is 
dominated by the Board of Directors and the Audit Committee decisions. In addition, Abdullah 
et al (2013) stated that only 5 of the 23 SSB perform Islamic compliance verification in 
allocating profit or loss sharing and in terms of the validity of zakat calculations. This shows 
that there is still a lack of knowledge of SSB about finance and accounting. And there is also the 
issue of information unconformity beetween board of directors and SSB. This result is in line 
with Hamdi & Zarai's (2014) found that the competence of SSB has no effect on profit 
management mitigation. 
4. Conclusion & Recommendations 
This study aims to analyze the effect of Shariah Supervisory Board's function on improving the 
quality of earning in Islamic banks. Data obtained from the financial statements of 12 full fledge 
Islamic Banks in Indonesia with annual report period from 2010 to 2015. Due to data 
limitations, the amount of observation data obtained amounted to 53 observation of the target 60 
data observation. SSB function variable consists of Size, Frequency of Meetings and 
Educational Background of financial and or accounting. The quality of earning is measured by 
the Discretionary Loan Loss Provision. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the size of SSB has significant effect to 
the earning quality. This is a factor that affects the low quality of earning. This explains that 
with the presence of more than one member of SSB has potentially reduced the discretionary 
Loan Loss Provision in Islamic banks. However, the other two variables are the frequency of 
SSB meetings and the educational background of financial and accounting has no effect on the 
quality of earning in the financial statements of Islamic banks. This shows that SSB is still weak 
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in providing supervision on the indication of earning manipulation in the financial statements of 
Islamic banks. The more frequent the meetings of SSB can not guarantee to improve the earning 
quality of Islamic banks. Similar with the lack of expertise in accounting and finance cause of 
the lack of supervision ability on the earning quality.  
Further research could add a sample of Baitul Mal Wa Tamwil (BMT) and Islamic Rural Bank 
(Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Syariah) which are the both have Shariah Supervisory Boards. 
Furthermore the issues regarding the level of SSB independence in providing supervision of 
Islamic banks. The research method can be added by interviewing SSB members to investigate 
how far the role of SSB towards the policy determination related to the quality of financial 
statements. 
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